













How do civilians select internal displacement destinations during conflict? Existing research 
emphasizes the value of cascades as a guide to making these difficult decisions. Cascades may 
involve civilians following people in their social networks (community cascades), people with 
similar characteristics (co-ethnic cascades), or the crowd in general (herd cascades). Analyses 
relying upon interview or regression-based methodological approaches face substantial challenges 
in identifying the prevalence of, and relationship between, each type of cascade. While interview-
based approaches can incorporate location characteristics and movement patterns, they struggle 
with assessing aggregate trends. Meanwhile, regression-based approaches can assess aggregate 
trends, but they struggle with incorporating location characteristics and movement patterns. 
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) that conceive of locations as nodes in a network 
and movements between those locations as ties can overcome these challenges and assess 
aggregate trends while incorporating location characteristics and movement patterns. This paper 
demonstrates the utility of this approach using data from UNHCR on internal displacement in 
Somalia from 2007-2013. Results reveal that herd cascades only form at high displacement levels, 
co-ethnic cascades form at medium and high displacement levels, and community cascades form 
at all displacement levels. Therefore, cascades provide stronger guides for displacement-related 
decisions as civilians switch from following the crowd in general to following those with similar 
characteristics to following social ties.
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I. Introduction 
As refugee crises, most notably the Syrian refugee crisis, have captured the concern of 
governments worldwide, internal displacement is often overlooked. Yet, according to estimates 
from the International Organization of Migration (IOM), there are now approximately 20 million 
refugees (external displacement) worldwide, while there are approximately 40 million internally 
displaced people (IDPs) (UNHCR, 2015c). These internally displaced people concern host 
communities due to their increased likelihood of engaging in violent collective action, aggravating food 
insecurities, increasing housing prices in host communities, and facilitating conflict diffusion 
(Corps, 2012; FSNAU, 2015; Salehyan, 2011). Syria is currently the most infamous example of 
these dynamics. While its 4 million refugees are widely covered in international media, its 8 
million IDPs receive far less coverage, despite facing conditions that are arguably more severe 
(Martinez and Eng, 2016). Large-scale internal displacement also affects many African countries, 
such as Libya, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Somalia. 
 
As observers attempt to understand the processes driving internal displacement, there is a 
popular image of civilians fleeing for their lives from massacre. However, recent research shows 
that civilian decision-making incorporates considerations of a broad array of social, economic, 
geographic, and political factors, as well as expectations about conflict dynamics and potential 
threats (Schon, 2015; Rubin and Moore, 2007; Uzonyi, 2014). This decision-making produces 
patterns in displacement destinations. There is a wealth of scholarship examining patterns in 
refugee movement (Ruegger and Bohnet, 2015; Moore and Shellman, 2006; Moore and Shellman, 
2007). To improve explanations of these patterns for IDPs, this paper asks how civilians select 
their internal displacement destinations. 
 
Civilians weigh many factors while making decisions about their displacement while 
navigating a confusing information environment, in which it is difficult to distinguish fact from 
fiction (Schelling, 1981). This makes the act of interpreting existing information crucial, as well 
as extremely difficult. Facing this challenge, people often follow the behavior of others and form 
cascades, especially when the decision is risky (Göbel, 1998). Cascades result from the 
transformation of heterogeneous individual preferences and characteristics into group action 
(Granovetter, 1978). Civilians observing the formation of cascades can then use them as guides to 
interpreting existing information, thereby shaping their displacement decision-making. Such 
behavior is frequently documented in contexts with large-scale population movements, leading to 
the development of labels such as ‘chain migration’ (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 
2006; Ruegger and Bohnet, 2015; MacDonald and MacDonald, 1974).  
 
Cascades can involve different types of groups. Some argue that civilians move in herd 
cascades, converging on the same locations as other civilians that moved before them, regardless 
of whether these civilians have personal ties (Banerjee, 1992; Bauer et al., 2002; Epstein, 2008). 
Other scholars argue that civilians move in co-ethnic cascades, converging on co-ethnic locations 
(Ruegger and Bohnet, 2015; Steinberg, 2015; Bartel, 1989). Still, other scholars argue that 
civilians move in community cascades, converging on the same locations as their friends and 





to directly compare the patterns in how these types of cascades influence displacement 
destinations. 
 
This challenge comes from the inherent limitations of interview and regression-based 
approaches to the study of migration. Interview-based approaches can effectively incorporate 
location characteristics, including origin, transit, and destination locations, and movement patterns 
into nuanced analyses. Such analyses have been crucial for explanations of the transnational 
dynamics of migration (Horst, 2006; Whitehouse, 2012), remittance behavior (Lindley, 2010a), 
and for uncovering important mechanisms in the process of migration (Kane, 2013). However, 
they are often unable to assess broader correlations and aggregate migration trends. Regression-
based approaches can effectively assess aggregate migration trends (Czaika and Haas, 2014), but 
their requirement of using variables from a single level of analysis forces them to focus on location 
characteristics or movement patterns. They cannot fully incorporate both. 
 
Social network analysis, therefore, presents a valuable alternative. Migration scholars 
usually use social network analysis to examine networks of individuals and their relationships with 
each other. I apply social network analysis to examine networks of locations and internal 
displacement flows between those locations. This shift allows me to examine how people 
incorporate information about locations, and movements between locations, into their decisions of 
where to move. 
 
After conceiving of locations as nodes in a network and displacement movements between 
those locations as ties, Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) can incorporate both of these 
elements into a single quantitative analysis to consider aggregate trends in displacement. Internal 
displacement data from Somalia that tracks the origin and destination locations of each internal 
displacement movement facilitates this analysis (UNHCR, 2007). Network covariates that can be 
modeled with Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) can then directly measure each 
cascade type: ethnic homophily for co-ethnic cascades, preferential attachment for herd cascades, 
and transitivity for community cascades (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994; Maoz, 2010).  
 
Through ERGMs with thresholds for ties set at 1 person (Unweighted), 324 people (25th 
percentile of displacement movement magnitudes), 835 people (50th percentile of displacement 
movement magnitudes), and 2622 people (75th percentile of displacement movement magnitudes), 
it is then possible to detect patterns in the presence of each cascade type.1 These thresholds are 
arbitrary. The primary goal was to set several different threshold levels based on clear, objective 
criteria. 
 
Findings indicate that each cascade type forms at different thresholds. Herd cascades form 
at the 50th and 75th percentile of displacement movement magnitudes. Co-ethnic cascades form at 
the 25th percentile and above. Community cascades form at all displacement levels. This provides 
evidence as to when civilians use each cascade type as a guide. It supports the view that, when 
possible, civilians use the behavior of their social ties as guides. As displacement levels increase, 
                                                          
1 In this paper’s analysis, these thresholds will be referred to as Unweighted, 25th percentile, 50th 





the resultant confusion can make social ties difficult to track, so civilians resort to shared ethnicity 
as a Plan B. Even higher displacement levels can make the actions of others with shared ethnicity 
difficult to track, so civilians resort to following the crowd as a Plan C. This preference order can 
only be detected by disaggregating cascade models, and it reveals a key civilian preference order 
for following social ties, then co-ethnics, and then the crowd in general. 
 
 This paper will begin by explaining the complexity involved in civilian displacement 
decision-making. This complexity arises from the many factors civilians must weigh, as well as 
the uncertainty regarding the accuracy of available information about those factors. Responding to 
complexity, civilians use displacement cascades as a guide to interpreting available information. 
Then, this paper will specify three types of cascades: herd cascades, co-ethnic cascades, and 
community cascades. ERGMs using UNHCR data on Somali internal displacement movements 
facilitate an analysis of the patterns of each cascade type. Finally, the paper concludes with 
directions for future research on displacement and how other areas of contentious politics research 
may evaluate the roles of each cascade type. 
II. The Complexity of Civilian Decision-Making about 
Displacement 
Civilian decision-making about displacement weighs many social, economic, geographic, 
and political factors. Socially, civilians must consider the needs of their own families and 
households. Personal networks can provide the necessary resources for civilians to avoid 
movement, or they can make movement easier. They can also make certain displacement 
destinations more desirable (Harpvicken, 2009). Economically, civilians need the financial 
resources to move. At the same time, they must also weigh the economic conditions of their origin 
location and the economic conditions of their destination location (Adhikari, 2013). 
Geographically, civilians must consider the distances that they must travel and the types of terrain 
that they must navigate (Moore and Shellman, 2006). Politically, civilians must consider the level 
of physical threat that they face (Davenport et al., 2003). This combination of considerations can 
be extremely difficult to weigh.  
 
Thus, during conflict, civilians find it valuable to monitor as much information as possible 
about violence and wider conflict dynamics. This information can take many forms, such as media 
reports, rumors, conspiracy theories, signals, and experiences. Often, this information is unverified 
and may be distorted in numerous ways (Allport and Postman, 1947; Shibutani, 1966). The sum 
of all of this information forms a confusing information environment, in which it is difficult to 
distinguish fact from fiction. 
 
This confusing information environment requires civilians to find ways to interpret 
information, so that they may weigh the social, economic, geographic, and political factors that 
affect their decision-making about displacement. Facing this challenge, people often follow the 
behavior of others and form cascades. Cascades form when people with heterogeneous individual 
preferences and information choose to engage in group action (Granovetter, 1978). This is 





because they offer civilians a guide with which to interpret information and make decisions 
(Banerjee, 1992).2 
 
Cascades do not necessarily drive each movement during the displacement process. 
Instead, they drive the selection of final destination locations. This is important, as displacement 
often includes multiple movements. Each movement can involve new decisions (Karen Jacobsen 
and IDMC, 2008; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). Several factors make displacement a 
process that involves multiple movements. First, checkpoints and violence along roads motivate 
civilians to use different routes (Lubkemann, 2008; Singer and Massey, 1998; Lombard, 2013). 
Second, varying levels of access to transportation lead to variation in when and where civilians are 
able to move (Brachet, 2009; Steinberg, 2015; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). Third, 
households divide during the displacement process, motivating civilians to reconnect as soon as 
possible (Horst, 2006). 
 
Moreover, the desire for physical safety tends to drive the first movement in the 
displacement process. Civilians pursue other concerns, including economic prosperity, after 
physical safety is achieved (Metcalfe et al., 2012; Lauten and Kesmaecker-Wissing, 2015; Ferris, 
2014; Drumtra, 2014). As one Somali refugee comments, “When you flee your home, the only 
thing on your mind is safety. You keep moving until you find some place that is safe. Only when 
you have safety do you think about other factors, such as employment, health care, and food” 
(Author interview in Columbus, Ohio, in May 2015).  
 
This statement reveals another important reason for multiple movements. Displacement 
motivations change from one movement to another. In the common scenario that this Somali 
refugee describes, civilians often initially flee violence. Then, they realize that they need to keep 
moving in order to find a location where they can access necessities, such as jobs, health care, and 
food. This view of displacement asserts that individual movements have a primary motivation, but 
the complete journey from origin to final destination can involve many motivations. Such a 
multitude of motivations adds even more reasons that civilians can benefit from guides that help 
them interpret existing information. 
III. Cascade Models 
During armed conflict, cascades are arguably one of the most valuable guides for civilians. 
The following sections suggest a division of cascade models into three types: herd cascades, 
community cascades, and co-ethnic cascades. Each cascade type involves different kinds of 
connections between individuals involved in the cascade and different conditions under which 
individuals join each cascade type. Thus, rather than challenging information cascade models as a 
                                                          
2 Cascades matter for both refugees and IDPs, but for different reasons. The challenges of crossing 
country borders often mean that refugees face greater uncertainty in selecting destination locations 
and how to reach those locations. IDPs are arguably more vulnerable than refugees though, as they 






whole, this paper disaggregates cascade models in order to develop more precise explanations of 
how civilians select internal displacement destinations. 
a. Herd Cascades 
 Cascade models were developed primarily as models of herd behavior (Banerjee, 1992; 
Lohmann, 1993; Lohmann, 1994; Kuran, 1989; Ellis and Fender, 2011). When individuals are 
uncertain about the best course of action, they follow the behavior of others, regardless of whether 
social ties exist between them. As more people mobilize to participate in a given course of action, 
the herd behavior becomes a clearer guide about the desirability and potential for effectiveness of 
the action. Different types of individuals may wait for different thresholds of mobilization before 
choosing to participate, but observed group behavior should nevertheless increase their chances of 
participation. Furthermore, there may be advantages in conforming to group behavior, such as 
‘strength in numbers.’ These mechanisms of herd behavior are commonly asserted to exist in 
migration processes (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1974; Schelling, 1981; Epstein, 2008). Herd 
behavior could, therefore, be a key driver of the selection of displacement destinations. This leads 
to the following hypothesis 
. 
H1: IDPs are more likely to move to the same locations as other IDPs, regardless 
of the types of social ties that exist between them. 
b. Community Cascades 
Alternatively, social ties may be an important driver of whether individuals choose to 
participate in mobilization. In particular, civilians may take their cues from community members. 
There are many ways to define community (Agruwal and Gibson, 1999). In this paper, community 
is defined as a group of people who reside in close spatial and social proximity. Friends, family 
members, and neighbors are the key groups within an individual’s community. Community 
members live near each other, and they have regular social interactions. These elements of spatial 
and social proximity reinforce each other, as people that live close together naturally have more 
opportunities for social interaction (McPherson et al., 2001). 
Community cascades involve civilians moving to the same destination locations as other 
civilians from their origin location. In particular, it involves civilians converging on the same 
locations as friends, family members, and neighbors from their origin location. Civilians converge 
by communicating as much as possible with other displaced community members (Harpvicken, 
2009).  
The argument that origin communities converge on the same destination locations is 
different from arguing that all civilians move together. As civilians become separated from each 
other, they often attempt to reunite. This eventually produces a convergence upon certain 
destination locations. If all civilians from an origin community moved together, then there would 
not be any need to reunite later.  
Community connections can provide many important ‘network externalities’ to facilitate 
mobilization. The information, support, and resources from friendships can convince people to 





case of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Pakistan (Verkaaik, 2004). This insight has been 
applied even more broadly to protest movements and other kinds of mobilization (McAdam, 1986). 
Migration and displacement also draw upon these externalities from friends, family members, 
neighbors, and other community members (Epstein, 2008). With these considerations, this paper 
will test the following hypothesis. 
H2: IDPs are more likely to move to the same locations as other community 
members from their origin location. 
c. Co-ethnic Cascades 
While seeking community members, civilians may not be able to reconstitute their origin 
communities. Many civilians simply lose track of their origin communities as they leave their 
homes. This fragmentation of social ties motivates civilians to replace the fragmented social ties 
(Harpvicken, 2009). Such replacement social ties need to be durable and trustworthy. Short-term 
disposable ties may briefly provide necessary information, but they are not trustworthy enough to 
drive the selection of displacement destinations (Desmond, 2012).  
 
Instead, in the midst of the instability and uncertainty of conflict, civilians often turn to co-
ethnics (Habyarimana et al., 2007). In fact, a growing body of research argues that during conflict, 
intra-ethnic trust and generosity tend to increase (Bauer et al., 2011; Voors et al., 2012). These 
changes occur as conflicts instigate demographic changes, whereby areas that were ethnically 
heterogeneous pre-conflict become ethnically homogenous during conflict (Balcells and Steele, 
2016). This is especially likely in cases of ethnic cleansing (Kapteijns, 2013). Therefore, civilians 
who are unable to maintain their origin communities may move to locations inhabited by co-
ethnics (Whitehouse, 2012; Zilberg, 2011). This motivates the development of a third type of 
cascade: co-ethnic cascades.  
 
Recent studies provide additional evidence on the role of co-ethnic cascades. In their 
analysis of external displacement destinations, Ruegger and Bohnet (2015) find that refugees tend 
to flee to co-ethnic regions.  While there is insufficient data to determine whether this research on 
external displacement can also explain internal displacement, it does at least suggest that co-ethnic 
cascades merit consideration in an analysis of internal displacement. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: IDPs are more likely to move to co-ethnic locations. 
IV. Testing Cascade Models in the Context of Somali 
Internal Displacement 2007-2013 
 To evaluate these cascade models, I will focus my analysis on internal displacement in 
Somalia from 2007-2013. This time period begins with the dramatic escalation of violence 
resulting from the Ethiopian invasion at the end of 2006. This invasion provoked the rise of Al 
Shabaab in 2007 (Hansen, 2012). From that point, through 2013, conflict in Somalia has produced 
some of the largest internal displacement flows in the world. Between Ethiopia’s invasion at the 





(Lindley, 2010b). In total, over a million people left their homes from 2007-2013, with most people 
moving several times (Drumtra, 2014). As one of the world’s largest producers of internally 
displaced people, Somalia presents an important context in which to analyze how cascades 
influence the selection of internal displacement destinations. 
Admittedly, despite the magnitude of its internal displacement crisis, Somalia contains a 
relatively extreme combination of characteristics. These characteristics include Somalia’s nomadic 
traditions, state failure, foreign intervention, extreme poverty, environmental challenges, 
prolonged conflict, proliferation of armed groups, and clan divisions (Lewis, 2008; Aristide 
Zolberg et al., 1989).3 All of these characteristics influence displacement patterns (Massey and 
Bohra-Misha, 2011; Massey and Silva, 2014; Balcells and Steele, 2016). 
As a result, this paper’s primary goal of explaining the role of cascades in Somali internal 
displacement has inherent policy importance. The unique combination of characteristics in the case 
motivates the recognition of clear scope conditions (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Somalis, as a 
whole, have grown accustomed to adapting to hard times. Drought, violence, or a variety of other 
sources of insecurity have a history of displacing Somali civilians (Horst, 2006). In addition, 
nomadic traditions within Somalia help civilians respond and adapt to insecurity (Lewis, 2008). 
Furthermore, Somalia’s weak state apparatus has provided additional impetus for Somali civilians 
to become adaptable and ready to respond to insecurity (Lewis, 1994). This adaptability creates 
the possibility that Somalis may be more adept at responding to insecurity than civilians of other 
nationalities. Their established methods of responding to insecurity may thus be different from the 
methods civilians use in other contexts. However, cascades are consistently observed throughout 
cases of migration and displacement. Variation between cases should at most cause variation in 
the magnitude of different types of displacement cascades, not whether displacement cascades 
form. 
 
By focusing on the analysis of this single case, this paper benefits from the strengths of 
within-case analysis to build a nuanced explanation of how herd cascades, community cascades, 
and co-ethnic cascades influence the selection of internal displacement destinations in Somalia 
(Snyder, 2001). Future research could then make valuable contributions by extending and testing 
this explanation in other contexts. 
V. Analyzing Somali Internal Displacement as a Network 
To observe displacement cascades, it is important to observe civilian movements. In the 
aggregate, civilian movements provide the opportunity to assess the types of cascades that civilians 
form. These movements reveal connections between locations. This means that, by treating 
locations as nodes and movements as connections or ties between nodes, the system of population 
movements can be analyzed as a network. Social network analysis then provides a wealth of tools 
with which to analyze displacement patterns. 
 
                                                          
3 Somalia’s clan structure has driven clan politics to function comparably to ethnic politics in the 





Such an analysis begins with a descriptive assessment of displacement patterns. Social 
network analysis provides powerful tools to track the direction of movement, locations civilians 
most commonly leave, locations civilians most commonly seek, and the characteristics of origin 
and destination locations. These components of the displacement network provide important 
insights into which factors civilians consider during their displacement, and thereby how cascades 
can guide civilians through their decision-making about displacement. 
 
Next, Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) provide the opportunity to directly 
measure each cascade type through network covariates and measures of different kinds of network 
structures. By varying the thresholds for defining a connection between locations, ERGMs can 
then identify whether each cascade type exists at all displacement levels. 
 




where Y is the random variable for the network state (with realization y), g(y) is a vector of model 
statistics for network y, θ is the vector of coefficients for those statistics, and k(θ) represents the 
quantity in the numerator summed over all possible networks (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
 
ERGMs simultaneously allow both inference on covariates and for arbitrarily complex 
network structures to be modeled (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011). Moreover, ERGMs account for 
dependencies between locations (nodes) and connections (ties). There are several ways to interpret 
ERGMs. One way involves interpretation at the network level. At the network level, the network 
statistics directly condition the probability of the entire network—allowing us to estimate the effect 
of within-network configurations on the predicted probability of observing a particular instance of 
the network (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011). Simulating a large number of networks based on the 
ERGM parameters yields the opportunity to approximate the characteristics of the distribution of 
network statistics (Morris et al., 2008; Handcock and Gile, 2010). If the coefficient on a network 
statistic in ERGM is positive, then the observed network is likely to possess the given network 
characteristic.  
 
Another way involves interpretation at the dyad level. At the dyad level, the quantity of 
primary interest is the likelihood of tie formation between any two nodes. In the displacement 
context, this means that ERGMs are interested in the likelihood of civilians moving between any 
two locations (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011). If the coefficient on a dyad level statistic is positive, 
then that characteristic increases the likelihood of tie formation.  
 
Finally, at the monadic level, node characteristics affect the likelihood of tie formation with 
specific nodes. For undirected networks, node characteristics can affect the likelihood of the node 
forming ties with other nodes. For directed networks, in-degree node characteristics affect the 
likelihood of nodes receiving ties and out-degree node characteristics affect the likelihood of nodes 











For the unweighted networks, connections between locations, or network ties, will be 
defined by whether at least one person has moved from one location to the other during the 2007-
2013 time period in Somalia. This movement produces a directed tie between those locations. 
There are three weighted displacement networks, specifically 25th Percentile, 50th Percentile, and 
75th Percentile displacement networks. Each displacement network requires a progressively higher 
threshold to constitute the formation of a tie. This threshold increases to at least 324 people for the 
25th Percentile displacement network, at least 835 people for the 50th Percentile displacement 
network, and at least 2622 people for the 75th Percentile displacement network. Varying threshold 
levels provides the opportunity to assess whether expected relationships hold across all 
displacement flow magnitudes. It also accounts for the reality that displacement flows of 10 people 
between two locations are very different from flows of 1,000 people. 
 
There are two within-network configurations of particular interest for this analysis: 
preferential attachment and transitivity. Preferential attachment means that certain nodes are more 
likely to receive ties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This configuration in a network would indicate 
convergence towards specific locations, making preferential attachment a valid proxy for herd 
cascades. Transitivity means that civilians fleeing location A are divided between locations B and 
C with movements A B and AC. Then, civilians in location B reconstitute their community 
by joining their fellow community members in location C with a movement BC, as is displayed 
in Figure 1 (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Papachristos et al., 2013). If transitivity is driving 
convergence in displacement destinations, then there is evidence that civilians select displacement 
destinations based on which destination best facilitates the reconstituting of their communities. 
Rather than following the actions of any member of their society, civilians follow the actions of 
their own community members. This configuration is thereby a valid proxy for community 
cascades. 
 
Ethnic homophily can then serve as a measure for co-ethnic cascades. Homophily refers to 
the expectation that actors with similar characteristics are more likely to form connections with 





displacement destinations. This is because as displacement divides origin communities, civilians 
are likely to look to co-ethnics to help create a new, trustworthy community (Steinberg, 2015; 
Zilberg, 2011; Whitehouse, 2012; Horst, 2006). Ultimately, homophily exists because people trust 
and interact with those who are similar to them more than those who are dissimilar to them. Co-
ethnics provide durable ties that are valuable during times of instability, including displacement 
(Habyarimana et al., 2007). The incentive to draw upon the durable ties of co-ethnics increases as 
displacement flow magnitudes increase. Large displacement flows indicate that there is extreme 
chaos, thereby increasing the desire to find co-ethnics. 
VI. Data on Network Ties 
The UNHCR Population Movement Tracking (PMT) initiative provides the displacement 
data for this analysis. This data tracks internal displacement in Somalia from 2007-2013 on a daily 
basis through coordination with 48 NGOs in Somalia and the UNHCR office in Nairobi. Internal 
displacement origins, destinations, dates, and primary reason for displacement are all included in 
this data source. The data tracks displacement movements, so it is not useful for counting the total 
number of IDPs. Instead, it is a valuable tool for understanding when people move, where they 
move to and from, and why they move. 
 
For each displacement movement, the data records one reason for the movement. Rather 
than dismissing the possibility that multiple factors may motivate displacement, the data simply 
focuses on the primary reason for each displacement movement. These reasons include insecurity, 
clan conflict, drought, flood, famine, fire, lack of livelihood, eviction, relocation, IDP return, and 
forced return (UNHCR, 2007). Insecurity accounts for the overwhelming majority of Somali 
internal displacement. 
 
However, this data source is not perfect. International NGOs have a very limited presence 
in Somalia, which minimizes the oversight for local NGOs. In addition, it is very difficult to track 
all displacement movements. Large movements may overwhelm those attempting to monitor them 
(Crisp, 1999). Within-city displacement is often missed by monitors (Karen Jacobsen and IDMC, 
2008). Civilians moving to stay with family members or friends may not always be counted as 
displacement. Displacement in rural areas is also difficult to monitor due to the lack of people and 
infrastructure (Brookings, 2013). Moreover, there are incentives to inflate estimates of internal 
displacement flows (Watch, 2013). 
 
Despite these concerns, UNHCR’s PMT initiative is the first and only publicly available 
data source that captures internal displacement with such detail. UNHCR has invested substantial 
resources in collaborating with so many local NGOs, and they are surely able to capture the 
important displacement trends in Somalia (Lindley 2010b; Schon 2015). 
VII. Data on Network Node Attributes 
Network nodes were created with four attributes. These attributes include clan, urban, road, 
and control changes. The clan attribute refers to the largest clan in each location. There is 
disagreement on the number and structure of clan groups in Somalia, but this paper uses Hawiye, 





Somalia’s district capitals.4 Road refers to whether the location is within 10 kilometers of a road 
used by the World Food Program (WFP) on its aid distribution routes. WFP roads are a subset of 
all roads in Somalia, but it is reasonable to expect that they are the largest and most salient roads 
in Somalia. Major roads provide opportunities for access to transportation, information, and 
necessary resources (Joireman et al., 2012; Klaeger, 2013). The control changes attribute measures 
whether there have been any battles where territorial control changed hands within 10 kilometers 
of a given location. This attribute approximates the level of competition for each location. All of 
these attributes are displayed on a map in the appendix. 
 
The urban attribute is a dichotomous variable. It is coded as 1 when the location is a district 
capital and 0 otherwise. Some district capitals in Somalia contain small populations, so they are 
not all equally important. Still, district capitals are most likely to be the locations where civilians 
can find humanitarian aid, jobs, and other resources when they are in need. Out of 296 locations, 
65 of them are urban. 
 
Road is also a dichotomous variable. It is coded as 1 when the location is within 10 
kilometers of a road used by the WFP and 0 otherwise. Locations close to roads are likely to be 
easier to leave and easier to reach. They are also more likely to have access to humanitarian 
assistance. There are 170 locations near WFP roads. From these 170 locations, 120 of them are not 
near urban areas.  On the other hand, 15 urban areas are not near WFP roads. 
 
Clan is a factor variable. It codes each node based on the largest clan in each location. 
While the proper manner in which to disaggregate the Somali population into clans is an open 
debate, this paper uses Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Rahanweyn, and Bantu. In order to code each location, 
a map image of the distribution of clans in Somalia was georeferenced using 8 reference points. 
Locations within a clan zone are coded as being populated by that clan. This variable does not 
capture the distribution of clans within each location, so it is unable to distinguish whether there 
is a neighborhood within a location that is heavily populated by a minority clan. However, it is 
able to provide information about the main clan in each location. Out of the 296 locations, 3 are 
Bantu, 65 are Darod, 22 are Dir, 159 are Hawiye, and 47 are Rahanweyn. 
 
This coding neglects the distribution of clans in each location, as well as whether there are 
prominent neighborhoods of minority clans in a given location. Research on Somali refugees often 
notes how they cluster with their clans and sub-clans within cities, such as Nairobi and 
Johannesburg (Thompson, 2015; Horst, 2006; Ndzovu, 2014). Future research could make a 
valuable contribution by providing more fine-grained data on the distributions of clans within 
Somalia. 
 
 The control changes attribute is another dichotomous variable. It is coded as 1 when there 
was at least one battle involving a change in territorial control from 2007-2013 within 10 
kilometers of the location and 0 otherwise (Clionadh Raleigh et al., 2010). This variable is more  
                                                          
4 This study does not use population data due to the unreliability of population data in Somalia. 
Population estimates that exist can vary dramatically between sources. See the variation between 






Figure 2.  Somalia Displacement Flow Network* 
 
 
*Label size is based on weighted in-degree centrality. Edges are weighted based on IDP flows. 
appropriate than a count of violent events because it can show whether one armed group was firmly 
in control of a location. Unstable territorial control could increase the likelihood of displacement 
from locations and decrease the desirability of a location as a displacement destination. There are 
64 locations with at least one control change. 
 
 Variables involving these node attributes, as well as configurations of network ties, reveal 
a great deal of information about displacement patterns. While ERGMs are needed to properly 
assess the role of cascades, descriptive information about the network can provide important 
context and information about the kinds of factors that may be motivating displacement cascades. 
VIII. Descriptive Information about Internal Displacement in 
Somalia 
 In order to illustrate the displacement flow network in Somalia from 2007-2013, there are 
six plots of the internal displacement network. All of these plots display the magnitude of the 
displacement flow between locations by varying line thickness. Thicker lines indicate larger 
displacement flow magnitudes. All nodes are represented by dots, and the location name labels 
each node. The label size represents the weighted in-degree in Figure 2 and weighted out-degree 
in Figure 3. Additional figures that are displayed in color in the online appendix use label size to 
represent the weighted degree of each location. These figures represent node and edge colors based 
on attribute characteristics. 
 
These plots indicate that there are some locations with particularly notable displacement 





Figure 3.  Somalia Displacement Flow Network* 
 
* Label size is based on weighted out-degree centrality. Edges are weighted based on IDP flows. 
 
understandable. Mogadishu is a hotly contested city by Somalia’s armed groups, territorial control 
changes frequently, and humanitarian aid organizations cluster in Mogadishu and its airport. With 
large displacement magnitudes to and from Mogadishu, it would be worthwhile to unpack the 
numerous factors at play within the city. While this in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper, Figure 4 shows only the displacement flows to and from Mogadishu for descriptive benefit. 
 
Figure 4.  Mogadishu Section of Somalia Displacement Flow Network* 
 






Table 1. Weighted Degree Centrality Measures 
 Weighted Degree Weighted In-Degree 
Weighted Out-
Degree 
#1 Mogadishu (1115853) Afgooye (255709) Mogadishu (1063203) 
#2 Afgooye (311639) Gaalkacyo (66879) Guri-Ceel (157391) 
#3 Guri-Ceel (199090) Xaawo-Cabdi (61631) Belet Weyne (95047) 
#4 Belet Weyne (118231) Dhobley (59326) Afgooye (55930) 
#5 Gaalkacyo (89804) Mogadishu (52650) Laas Caanood (53759) 
 
To highlight important locations beyond Mogadishu, I turn to weighted in-degree and out-
degree centrality measures in Table 1. These measures indicate which locations receive and send 
the most displaced civilians respectively. While Mogadishu is by far the most common 
displacement origin and destination location, Afgooye and Dhuusamarreeb are also common 
origin and destination locations. Guri-Ceel and Belet Weyne are common origin locations, whereas 
Gaalkacyo and Dhobley are common destination locations. Afgooye is the second most important 
city in this network. Much of the displacement to and from Afgooye involves Mogadishu, 
highlighting that the Mogadishu-Afgooye dyad is also the most important dyad for displacement. 
Afgooye is a common first destination for civilians fleeing Mogadishu. In addition, civilians often 
travel through Afgooye on the way to Mogadishu. These centrality measures indicate that 
displaced Somali civilians do converge on specific locations. 
 
Displacement behavior also varies by clan as Table 2 displays. The Hawiye and Darod are 
the two largest clans, so, understandably, their locations have the largest in-flows and out-flows. 
On average, Hawiye locations send and receive the largest amounts of displaced people. Darod 
locations also send and receive large numbers of displaced persons, albeit less than Hawiye 
locations. Rahanweyn and Dir locations receive far more displaced people than they send, on 
average. Bantu locations, due to some extent by the relatively small Bantu population in Somalia, 
do not send nor receive large numbers of displaced people. 
 







Bantu 609 0 
Darod 5486 4801 
Dir 7407 3723 
Hawiye 8993 11647 











Table 3. Displacement Out-Flow by Attribute Traits 





Urban 11,880 156,866 42  
Road 156,866 1,821,790 7,672  
Control 
Changes 42 7,672 4,886  
ALL 
ATTRIBUTES    90,105 
 
Table 4. Displacement In-Flow by Attribute Traits 





Urban 28,459 311,491 8,063  
Road 311,491 1,066,419 44,814  
Control 
Changes 8,063 44,814 59,389  
ALL 
ATTRIBUTES    380,013 
 
There are also important dynamics to note with the urban, road, and control changes 
attributes as shown in Table 3. Tables of total displacement flows to and from locations highlight 
important trends. Locations along roads send the most displaced people, followed by urban 
locations, and then locations with control changes. This shows that transportation options facilitate 
displacement. Urban locations with control changes and no major roads send almost no displaced 
people. This reveals just how vital roads are for displacement. It also shows that locations with 
changes in territorial control deter displacement. 
 
There are additional observations to make regarding the characteristics of locations 
receiving displaced people as shown in Table 4. Again, locations with roads receive the most 
displaced people, followed by urban locations and then locations with control changes. Also, urban 
locations with control changes and without roads receive the fewest displaced people. It also adds 
to the argument that roads facilitate displacement. Also, urban areas receive far more displaced 
people than they send. 
 
It is also clear that displacement tends to occur in specific directions. While there are 507 
edges in the unweighted network, only 37 dyads had reciprocal ties. When the threshold for a tie 
is set at the 25th percentile, 28 dyads have reciprocal ties out of 363 edges. At the 50th percentile, 
17 dyads have reciprocal ties out of 239 edges. At the 75th percentile, 6 dyads have reciprocal ties 
out of 123 edges. So, when civilians move between two locations during displacement, they tend 






Table 5. Network Node Summary Statistics 
 Unweighted 
25 
Percentile 50 Percentile 75 Percentile 
Bantu 3 3 1 0 
Dir 22 14 10 7 
Rahanweyn 47 27 15 9 
Darod 65 50 37 19 
Hawiye 159 127 95 64 
Urban 65 58 53 43 
Control 
Changes 64 54 46 32 
Road 170 131 99 67 
Total 296 221 158 99 
 
IX. Consideration of Sparse Networks 
 The unweighted network is a very sparse network, with a density of 0.006. This means that 
only 0.6% of possible ties between nodes are realized. As thresholds are adjusted to the 25th, 50th, 
and 75th percentiles, many nodes become isolates, and the density decreases to even smaller levels. 
This creates problems with convergence for the ERGM models. ERGM models are already known 
to be unstable models that can have challenges with model degeneracy, so this is a practical 
concern that must be overcome (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). To overcome this obstacle, I 
disregard isolates from all weighted network models. 
  
Nodes that are disregarded at each threshold no longer have a sufficient displacement flow 
either to or from the location to have any ties to other nodes. Based on Table 5, the locations with 
control changes and Rahanweyn clan members are disregarded at the fastest rate due to the small 
displacement flows to or from them. 
 
 The small displacement flows to and from locations with Rahanweyn clan members offers 
an interesting observation about conflict dynamics in Somalia. While many clans and sub-clans 
fight each other in Somalia, some tensions are more serious than others. Darod and Hawiye clan 
tensions are arguably the most important clan tensions in south and central Somalia (Kapteijns, 
2013). Also, as the map in the Appendix illustrates, Rahanweyn clans are not the largest group in 
many major Somali cities like Mogadishu or Kismayo. Thus, while there are many Rahanweyn 
locations with displacement, the magnitude of Rahanweyn displacement appears smaller than the 
magnitude of displacement to and from locations inhabited by other clans. 
X. ERGM Results 
 
With this understanding of the descriptive characteristics of the Somali displacement 





Table 6. Unweighted Directed Network 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Edges -5.678*** 0.1112 -6.333*** 0.4820 -5.603*** 0.1195 
        
Main Effects       
In-Degree Urban -0.322* 0.1235 -0.033 0.0639 -0.291* 0.1227 
Out-Degree Urban -0.440 0.1260 -0.191 0.1038 -0.444*** 0.1280 
In-Degree Control Changes -0.059 0.1152  0.161* 0.0802 -0.062 0.1111 
Out-Degree Control Changes -0.452 0.1244 -0.242* 0.0951 -0.452*** 0.1241 
In-Degree Road  0.350* 0.0991 -0.040 0.0581  0.320* 0.0983 
Out-Degree Road  0.759 0.1029  0.349*** 0.0573  0.758*** 0.1025 
        
Homophily       
Clan  0.100* 0.0933  0.016 0.0597  0.101 0.0928 
        
Network Structure       
Transitivity    2.616*** 0.4458   
Preferential Attachment         -0.269 0.1900 
AIC 120980 5519 5912 
Number of Nodes 296 
Displacement Threshold 1 
 
of varying cascade types. In this analysis of cascade types, observed trends exist while controlling 
for the monadic effects of transportation costs, violence, and urban areas. 
 
Goodness of fit tests show that dyad dependence models are the most appropriate at all 
threshold levels. At the unweighted, 25th, and 50th percentiles, the best model specifications at each 
threshold level include transitivity and not preferential attachment. At the 75th percentile, the best 
model specification includes both transitivity and preferential attachment.5 Model results in the 
tables below show the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) statistic for each model. They also show 
the number of network nodes and the displacement flow threshold required for a tie to exist. 
Additional goodness of fit results are included in the appendix.  
a. How Herd Cascades Influence Internal Displacement Destinations 
Model results reveal important nuances in how herd cascades, measured as preferential 
attachment, influence internal displacement destinations. Table 6 and Table 7 show that herd 
cascades are not statistically significant for the unweighted network or for the 25th percentile  
  
                                                          
5 Models including both the transitivity and preferential attachment terms do not converge with 
the unweighted and 50th percentile networks. This indicates that these model specifications do 





Table 7. 25th Percentile Directed Network 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Edges -5.257*** 0.1240 -6.108*** 0.2097 -5.487*** 0.1285 -5.223*** 0.1375 
          
Main Effects         
In-Degree 
Urban  0.089 0.1340  0.201*** 0.0407  0.199 0.1389  0.0865 0.1328 
Out-Degree 
Urban -0.268 0.1468 -0.313*** 0.0391 -0.056 0.1329 -0.2674 0.1496 
In-Degree 
Control 
Changes -0.093 0.1377 -0.048 0.0391  0.127 0.1080 -0.0913 0.1323 
Out-Degree 
Control 
Changes -0.527*** 0.1536 -0.527*** 0.0481 -0.243 0.1564 -0.528*** 0.1533 
In-Degree 
Road  0.157 0.1184  0.037 0.0288 -0.056 0.1211  0.1499 0.1154 
Out-Degree 
Road  0.427*** 0.1177  0.335*** 0.0364  0.120 0.0844  0.429*** 0.1185 
          
Homophily         
Clan  0.275* 0.1102  0.278*** 0.0305  0.149 0.1208  0.272* 0.1084 
          
Network 
Structure         
Transitivity    2.952*** 0.1792  1.819*** 0.0646   
Preferential 
Attachment      0.845 1857.1505     -0.1192 0.2166 






network. Instead, Table 8 and Table 9 show that herd cascades are statistically significant at the 
50th and 75th percentile. In short, herd cascades matter only at high displacement levels. 
a. How Co-ethnic Cascades Influence Internal Displacement Destinations 
Co-ethnic cascades follow a similar pattern as herd cascades, except they begin to matter at 





Table 8. 50th Percentile Directed Network 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Edges -5.782*** 0.1796 -5.290*** 0.1335 -6.029*** 0.2074 
        
Main Effects       
In-Degree Urban  0.232 0.1612 -0.157 0.0885  0.290 0.1830 
Out-Degree Urban  0.948*** 0.1450  0.340*** 0.0866 0.951*** 0.1464 
In-Degree Control Changes  0.115 0.1642 -0.241** 0.0863  0.151 0.1824 
Out-Degree Control Changes  1.138*** 0.1496  0.430*** 0.0663 1.139*** 0.1510 
In-Degree Road  0.088 0.1518  0.021 0.0813  0.111 0.1735 
Out-Degree Road -0.051 0.1683  0.003 0.0591 -0.054 0.1690 
        
Homophily       
Clan  0.473*** 0.1367  0.167** 0.0631  0.489*** 0.1362 
        
Network Structure       
Transitivity    1.901*** 0.1152   
Preferential Attachment          0.733** 0.2764 
AIC 34255 2296 2387 
Number of Nodes 158 
Displacement Threshold 835 
 
unweighted network. Table 7 shows that when the percentile is set at the 25th percentile, three out 
of the four models yield a significant coefficient for co-ethnic homophily. This provides strong 
evidence that co-ethnic cascades begin at the 25th percentile. Then, Table 8 and Table 9 show that 
co-ethnic homophily is significant across all models for thresholds at the 50th percentile and at the 
75th percentile. Therefore, while co-ethnic cascades do not matter at low displacement levels, they 
become important at lower levels than herd cascades. This supports the view that civilians seek 
out people with similar characteristics when possible, rather than simply ‘following the crowd’ as 
herd cascades would suggest. 
a. How Community Cascades Influence Internal Displacement Destinations 
Meanwhile, community cascades influence internal displacement destinations at all 
thresholds of displacement magnitudes. Tables 6-9 show that transitivity is significant across all 
models. Regardless of whether displacement levels are high or low, civilians follow their origin 
community members. 
 
This discrepancy between the results for community cascades versus the results for herd 
cascades and co-ethnic cascades support the assertion that displacement cascades function 
differently depending upon whether they are following personal connections. Herd cascades 
involve people ‘following the crowd’. Co-ethnic cascades involve people following others with 





Table 9. 75th Percentile Directed Network 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Edges -5.738*** 0.3220 -6.857*** 0.4232 -5.726*** 0.3049 -6.517*** 0.4109 
          
Main Effects         
In-Degree 
Urban -0.053 0.2234 -0.011 0.3143 0.051 0.2094 -0.134 0.3086 
Out-Degree 
Urban -0.882** 0.2742 -0.715** 0.2639 -0.722** 0.2639 -0.876** 0.2773 
In-Degree 
Control 
Changes 0.018 0.2228  0.240 0.2955 0.127 0.2008 0.067 0.3094 
Out-Degree 
Control 
Changes -1.012*** 0.2675 -0.824** 0.2537 -0.860*** 0.2571 -1.005*** 0.2702 
In-Degree Road 0.240 0.2151  0.189 0.3122 0.043 0.2053 0.413 0.3080 
Out-Degree 
Road 1.723*** 0.2820  1.457*** 0.2764 1.481*** 0.2875 1.719*** 0.2839 
          
Homophily         
Clan 0.503** 0.1921  0.434* 0.1810 0.399* 0.1661 0.552** 0.2022 
          
Network 
Structure         
Transitivity    2.099*** 0.1924 1.507*** 0.1496   
Preferential 
Attachment      2.393*** 0.4084     1.774*** 0.3853 






personal networks. This distinction reveals a critical hierarchy governing the importance of each 
cascade type, in which civilians prioritize their social networks, then groups with similar 
characteristics, and then general crowds. Thus, rather than classifying cascades as a single category 
of behavior, it really is important to disaggregate displacement cascades into multiple typologies. 
 
Jonny Steinberg describes this hierarchy in practice in his biographical account A Man of 
Good Hope. This account tells the story of a Somali man’s displacement from Mogadishu as a 
child in 1991, life in Kenya and Ethiopia, moving down to South Africa, and then life in South 
Africa. Every time Somalis reach a new and unfamiliar place, their first response is to inquire 
about the whereabouts of other Somalis. This process begins with a search for close family 







Within sub-clans and clans, Somalis are noted for their generosity, but this generosity is 
unreliable across clan lines (Menkhaus, 2003; Lewis, 1994). This dynamic makes the distinction 
between herd cascades, co-ethnic cascades, and community cascades particularly critical in the 
Somali context. However, Somalia is far from the only country with ethnic divisions. Especially 
during the polarizing conditions of armed conflict, distinctions in the patterns of different cascade 
types are likely to appear in many contexts.  
XI. Applications for Future Research 
 These findings, drawn from the context of Somalia, would be valuable to test in other 
contexts. Like Somalia, African countries such as Libya, Central African Republic, South Sudan, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo all face the challenges of conflict and large-scale 
displacement. Their civilians must also deal with challenging ethnic, tribal, or clan politics, and 
weak states. It is therefore likely that patterns in the formation of herd cascades, co-ethnic cascades, 
and community cascades would be similar between these cases. If subsequent analyses contradict 
this expectation, they would have the potential to contribute valuable nuances from the perspective 
of their own unique contexts. 
 
These cascade models can help explain a variety of other mobilization activities as well. 
Protest mobilization may involve a combination of herd cascades, community cascades, and co-
ethnic cascades. Rebel groups and terrorist organizations also may employ all three of these 
cascade models. Studying cascade types during other mobilization activities can reveal whether 
they demonstrate the same kinds of patterns. Cascade models have been a powerful tool for social 
scientists attempting to explain political mobilization. They will become even more powerful as 









Adhikari P. (2013) Conflict-Induced Displacement, Understanding the Causes of Flight. American 
Journal of Political Science 57: 82-89. 
Agruwal A and Gibson CC. (1999) Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community 
in Natural Resource Conservation. World Development 27: 629-649. 
Allport G and Postman L. (1947) The Psychology of Rumor, New York: Russell & Russell. 
Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo. (1989) Escape from Violence: Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Balcells L and Steele A. (2016) Warfare, Political Identities, and Displacement in Spain and 
Colombia. Political Geography 51: 15-29. 
Banerjee A. (1992) A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 
797-817. 
Bartel AP. (1989) Where do the new US immigrants live? Journal of Labor Economics: 371-391. 
Bauer M, Cassar A and Chytilová J. (2011) Warfare and social preferences in children. Discussion 
Paper, University of San Francisco. 
Bauer TK, Epstein GS and Gang IN. (2002) Herd effects or migration networks? The location 
choice of Mexican immigrants in the US. 
Beach D and Pedersen RB. (2013) Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines, Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Brachet J. (2009) Migrations Transsahariennes: Vers un Desert Cosmopolite et Morcele (Niger): 
Editions du Croquant. 
Brookings. (2013) Under the Radar: Internally Displaced Persons in Non-Camp Settings. 
Washington DC: Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. 
Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Havard Hegre, et al. (2010) Introducing ACLED- Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data. Journal of Peace Research 47: 1-10. 
Corps M. (2012) Analysis of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq, Jordan. UNHCR. 
(accessed October). 
Cranmer S and Desmarais B. (2011) Inferential Network Analysis with Exponential Random 
Graph Models. Political Analysis 19: 66-86. 
Crisp J. (1999) Who has counted the refugees? UNHCR and the politics of numbers. New Issues 





Czaika M and Haas Hd. (2014) The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More 
Migratory? International Migration Review 48: 283-323. 
Davenport C, Moore W and Poe S. (2003) Sometimes You Just Have to Leave: Domestic Threats 
and Forced Migration, 1964-1989. International Interactions: 27-55. 
Desmond M. (2012) Disposable Ties and the Urban Poor. American Journal of Sociology 117: 
1295-1335. 
Drumtra J. (2014) Internal Displacement in Somalia. Washington DC: Brookings-LSE Project on 
Internal Displacement. 
Ellis CJ and Fender J. (2011) Information Cascades and Revolutionary Regime Transitions. The 
Economic Journal 121: 763-792. 
Epstein GS. (2008) Herd and network effects in migration decision-making. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 34: 567-583. 
Ferris E. (2014) Ten Years After Humanitarian Reform: How are IDPs Faring? Washington DC: 
Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. 
FSNAU. (2015) Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Analysis: Post Gu 2015. FSNAU. (accessed 
October 2). 
Göbel B. (1998) Risk, uncertainty and economic exchange in a pastoral community of the Andean 
highlands (NW Argentina). Kinship, Networks and Exchange, eds. T. Schweizer and D. 
White. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 158-177. 
Granovetter M. (1978) Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. The American Journal of 
Sociology 83: 1420-1443. 
Habyarimana J, Humphreys M, Posner D, et al. (2007) Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine 
Public Goods Provision? American Political Science Review 101: 709-725. 
Handcock MS and Gile KJ. (2010) Modeling social networks from sampled data. The Annals of 
Applied Statistics 4: 5. 
Hansen SJ. (2012) Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 
2005-2012, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Harpvicken KB. (2009) Social Networks and Migration in Wartime Afghanistan, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Horst C. (2006) Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in the Dadaab 
Camps of Kenya, New York: Berghahn Books. 
Joireman S, Sawyer A and Wilhoit J. (2012) A Different Way Home: Resettlement Patterns in 





Kane A. (2013) African migrations: patterns and perspectives: Indiana University Press. 
Kapteijns L. (2013) Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Karen Jacobsen and IDMC. (2008) Internal Displacement to Urban Areas: The Tufts-IDMC 
Profiling Study. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 
Klaeger G. (2013) Dwelling on the Road: Routines, Rituals and Roadblocks in Southern Ghana. 
Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute 83: 446-469. 
Kuran T. (1989) Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Revolution. Public Choice 
61: 41-74. 
Lauten B and Kesmaecker-Wissing M. (2015) IDPs' decision-making in the DRC. Geneva, 
Switzerland: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council. 
Lewis I. (2008) Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, London: Hurst Publishers Ltd. 
Lewis IM. (1994) Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society, Lawrenceville: The Red 
Sea Press. 
Lindley A. (2010a) The early morning phone call: Somali refugees' remittances: Berghahn Books. 
Lindley A. (2010b) Leaving Mogadishu: Towards a Sociology of Conflict-Related Mobility. 
Journal of Refugee Studies 23: 2-22. 
Lohmann S. (1993) A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action. The 
American Political Science Review 87: 319-333. 
Lohmann S. (1994) The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in 
Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91. World Politics 47: 42-101. 
Lombard L. (2013) Navigational Tools for Central African Roadblocks. Political and Legal 
Anthropology Review 36: 157-173. 
Lubkemann S. (2008) Involuntary Immobility: On a theoretical invisibility in forced migration 
studies. Journal of Refugee Studies 21: 454-475. 
MacDonald J and MacDonald L. (1974) Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation, and 
Social Networks. In: Tilly C (ed) An Urban World. Boston: Little, Brown, 226-236. 
Maoz Z. (2010) Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International 
Networks, 1816-2001, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Martinez JC and Eng B. (2016) The unintended consequences of emergency food aid: neutrality, 






Massey D and Bohra-Misha P. (2011) Individual Decisions to Migrate During Civil Conflict. 
Demography 48: 401-424. 
Massey D and Silva AC. (2014) Violence, Networks, and International Migration from Colombia. 
International Migration: 1-17. 
McAdam D. (1986) Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer. American 
Journal of Sociology 92: 64-90. 
McPherson M, Smith-Lovin L and Cook JM. (2001) Birds of a Feather? Homophily in Social 
Networks. Annual Review of Sociology 27: 415-444. 
Menkhaus K. (2003) State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts. Review of African Political 
Economy 30: 405-422. 
Metcalfe V, Haysom S and Martin E. (2012) Sanctuary in the City? Urban Displacement and 
Vulnerability in Kabul. Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper. 
Moore W and Shellman S. (2006) Refugee or Internally Displaced Person? To where should one 
flee? Comparative Political Studies: 599-622. 
Moore W and Shellman S. (2007) Whither Will They Go? A Global Study of Refugees' 
Destinations, 1965-1995. International Studies Quarterly: 811-834. 
Morris M, Handcock MS and Hunter DR. (2008) Specification of exponential-family random 
graph models: terms and computational aspects. Journal of Statistical Software 24: 1548. 
Ndzovu HJ. (2014) Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political Involvement, Marginalization, and 
Minority Status, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 
Papachristos A, Hureau D and Braga A. (2013) The Corner and the Crew: The Influence of 
Geography and Social Networks on Gang Violence. American Sociological Review 78: 
417-447. 
Parkinson SE. (2013) Organizing rebellion: Rethinking high-risk mobilization and social networks 
in war. American Political Science Review 107: 418-432. 
Rawlence B. (2016) City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World's Largest Refugee Camp, New York: 
MacMillan Publishers. 
Rubin J and Moore W. (2007) Risk Factors for Forced Migrant Flight. Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 24: 85-104. 
Ruegger S and Bohnet H. (2015) The Ethnicity of Refugees (ER): A new dataset for understanding 
flight patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science: 1-24. 
Salehyan I. (2011) Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics, Ithaca: 





Schelling T. (1981) The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press: Cambridge. 
Schon J. (2015) Focus on the Forest, Not the Trees: A Changepoint Model of Forced Displacement. 
Journal of Refugee Studies 28: 437-467. 
Shibutani T. (1966) Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor, New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc. 
Singer A and Massey D. (1998) The Social Process of Undocumented Border Crossing among 
Mexican Migrants. International Migration Review 32: 561-592. 
Snyder R. (2001) Scaling down: The subnational comparative method. Studies in Comparative 
International Development 36: 93-110. 
Steinberg J. (2015) A Man of Good Hope, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Thompson DK. (2015) Risky Business and Geographies of Refugee Capitalism in the Somali 
Migrant Economy of Gauteng, South Africa. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 
Triandafyllidou A and Maroukis T. (2012) Migrant Smuggling: Irregular Migration from Asia 
and Africa to Europe, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
UNHCR. (2007) UNHCR's Population Movement Tracking Initiative- FAQs. 
UNHCR. (2015c) Worldwide Displacement Hits All-Time High as War and Persecution Increase. 
(accessed June 18). 
Uzonyi G. (2014) Unpacking the Effects of Genocide and Politicide on Forced Migration. Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 31: 225-243. 
Verkaaik O. (2004) Migrants and militants : fun and urban violence in Pakistan. Princeton, N.J. :: 
Princeton University Press. 
Voors MJ, Nillesen EE, Verwimp P, et al. (2012) Violent conflict and behavior: a field experiment 
in Burundi. The American Economic Review 102: 941-964. 
Wasserman S and Faust K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Watch HR. (2013) Hostages of the Gatekeepers: Abuses against Internally Displaced in 
Mogadishu, Somalia. 
Whitehouse B. (2012) Migrants and Strangers in an African City: Exile, Dignity, and Belonging, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Zilberg E. (2011) Space of Detention: The Making of a Transnational Gang Crisis Between Los 

















Somalia Displacement Flow Network by Clan 
Note: Label size is based on weighted degree centrality. Edges are weighted 
based on IDP flows. Red nodes are Hawiye. Green nodes are Darod. Purple 







Somalia Displacement Flow Network by Control Changes 
Note: Label size is based on weighted degree centrality. Edges are weighted 









Somalia Displacement Flow Network by Road 
Note: Label size is based on weighted degree centrality. Edges are weighted 







Below are the goodness of fit plots for each ERGM model. These plots informed the selection of 
the best fitting models. In the main text, the best fitting model at each threshold level turns out to 
be the model with the lowest AIC statistic. 
Somalia Displacement Flow Network by Urban 
Note: Label size is based on weighted degree centrality. Edges are weighted 


















Note: These diagnostics produced some error messages, which is why there are thick solid black 
lines on two of the plots. 
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